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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The heteronormativity1 of federal tax law and policy was no secret before United States v. 
Windsor.2 In that landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the portion of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that refused recognition to same-sex marriages for purposes of 
federal law—including the tax laws at issue in the case—as a violation of “basic due process and 
equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.” 3  Following the Windsor 
decision, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) acted quickly to issue guidance to same-sex couples 
indicating how the agency would apply the decision to the federal tax laws. The IRS’s guidance 
recognized a broader range of marriages than some had expected, and it attempted to place this 
broad swath of married same-sex couples on ostensibly equal tax footing with married different-
sex couples.4 Given this quick action and the IRS’s broad and enthusiastic interpretation of the 
                                                 
* Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law. Thanks to Bridget Crawford for comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
1 See generally Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 
129 (1998). 
2 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
3 Id. at 2693. 
4 In Revenue Ruling 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, the IRS adopted a “place of celebration” rule 
for purposes of determining the marital status of same-sex couples rather than the less generous 
“place of residence” or “place of domicile” rule that would have denied recognition to the 
marriages of same-sex couples in the majority of states. See MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43157, THE POTENTIAL FEDERAL TAX IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED 
STATES V. WINDSOR (STRIKING SECTION 3 OF THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (DOMA)): 
SELECTED ISSUES 1 (2013) (“As a result of the SCOTUS decision, it appears that these statutory 
provisions will be applied in the same manner to married same-sex couples as they are to married 
opposite-sex couples—at least for those married same-sex couples residing in states that recognize 
their marriages. It is currently unclear whether the provisions will also apply to married same-sex 
couples who are residing in a state where the marriage is not recognized.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners Debate Expected IRS Guidance on Marital Status, 140 TAX NOTES 
529 (2013) (recounting how “[p]ractitioners speaking on two separate webcasts … debated 
whether the IRS will adopt a state of celebration test or a state of residence test in its expected 
guidance on determining marital status in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Windsor”); Annie Lowrey, Gay Marriages in All States Get Recognition from the I.R.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at A12 (describing the IRS’s guidance as “the broadest federal rule 
change to come out of the landmark Supreme Court decision in June that struck down the 1996 
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Windsor decision in favor of same-sex couples,5 it might be tempting to postulate that we have 
now entered a post-heteronormative tax world.6 
 Despite the IRS’s good intentions, we are still far from a tax system in which 
heteronormativity is an artifact of history. As I have explained elsewhere, far from making things 
clear and simple for same-sex couples by placing them on equal legal footing with different-sex 
couples, the IRS’s post-Windsor guidance actually “provides no more than the same veneer of 
clarity that DOMA did, as it leaves important questions unanswered, lays traps for the unwary, 
creates inequities, and entails unfortunate (and, hopefully, unintended) consequences.”7 In this 
essay, I continue to plumb the gap between the promise of Windsor and the reality that 
heteronormativity has been one of the core building blocks of our federal tax system. Eradicating 
embedded heteronormativity will take far more than a single court decision or revenue ruling; it 
will take years of work uncovering the subtle ways in which heteronormativity pervades our 
federal tax laws and of identifying means of eliminating that heteronormativity. To further this 
work and in keeping with the theme of this symposium issue, “Compensated Surrogacy After 
Windsor,” I will here explore the unremitting heteronormativity of the federal tax incentives for 
procreation as they apply to compensated surrogacy, which is the only practical option for gay 
couples wishing to procreate. 
 The remainder of this essay is divided into four parts. To set the stage for understanding 
the gap between rhetoric and reality, Part II summarizes the series of legal decisions, beginning 
with Windsor, that extol the equality of same-sex and different-sex couples, affirm the importance 
of marriage not only to same-sex couples but also to their children, and validate same-sex couples 
as fit parents. Part III continues the stage setting by explaining how the IRS has acted in keeping 
with this rhetoric by implementing the Windsor decision in a way that aims for a sexual-
                                                 
Defense of Marriage Act, and a sign of how quickly the government is moving to treat gay couples 
in the same way that it does straight couples”). 
5 Alexei Koseff, IRS to Recognize All Legally Married Same-Sex Couples, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort 
Lauderdale, FL), Aug. 30, 2013, at 8A (“The new approach ‘provides access to benefits, 
responsibilities and protections under federal tax law that all Americans deserve,’ Treasury 
Secretary Jacob Lew said in a statement. ‘This ruling also assures legally married same-sex couples 
that they can move freely throughout the country knowing that their federal filing status will not 
change.’ ”); Annie Lowrey, IRS to Recognize Gay Couples, Regardless of State Measures, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 30, 2013, at A6 (quoting Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew as 
stating that Revenue Ruling 2013-17 provides “certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing guidance” 
for same-sex couples). 
6 Indeed, following the Windsor decision, colleagues have asked me at conferences whether I will 
be moving on to other areas of scholarly inquiry now that same-sex marriage is recognized for 
federal tax purposes. 
7 Anthony C. Infanti, The Moonscape of Tax Equality, 108 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 118 (2013), 
http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2013/10/the-moonscape-of-tax-equality.html 
[hereinafter Infanti, Moonscape]; see also Anthony C. Infanti, Big (Gay) Love: Has the IRS 
Legalized Polygamy?, ___ N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM ___ (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Infanti, 
Big (Gay) Love] (exploring how some commentators have taken the IRS’s generosity of spirit a 
step further and have interpreted ambiguity in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 in a way that may open 
the door to recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes). 
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orientation-neutral tax system (at least insofar as the definition of “marriage” is concerned). In 
contrast, Part IV recapitulates the longstanding heteronormativity of the tax incentives for 
procreation and explains the anticipated—and unremittingly heteronormative—operation of these 
tax incentives on compensated surrogacy post-Windsor. Because these tax incentives will, if 
anything, be more heteronormative after Windsor than they were before, Part V concludes by 
suggesting that this accentuated heteronormativity may open the previously closed door to 
constitutional scrutiny of the application of these incentives to procreation by married same-sex 
couples (and, by extension, other nontraditional families). The IRS and/or the courts could easily 
ensure that this door remains closed by abandoning past interpretations of § 213 in favor of a 
broader, more inclusive interpretation that is in keeping with the promise of the Windsor decision 
and the IRS’s actions post-Windsor. 
II. WINDSOR AND ITS PROGENY 
 In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Windsor8 
striking down as unconstitutional section three of DOMA. Prior to that decision, DOMA prohibited 
the recognition of same-sex marriages for purposes of federal law.9 In Windsor, a majority of the 
Court found that “[t]he avowed purpose and practical effect of [DOMA] are to impose a 
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made 
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”10 DOMA “discourage[d] enactment of state 
same-sex marriage laws and … restrict[ed] the freedom and choice of couples married under those 
laws … .”11 Thus, the Court concluded: 
DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and 
protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a disability on the class by 
refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper. DOMA 
instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples 
interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the 
marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, 
by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to 
displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less 
respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.12 
 Following the Windsor decision—both in time and, as the passage above suggests, often in 
reasoning—federal courts around the country have struck down one state same-sex marriage ban 
after another on constitutional grounds. A key component of all of these decisions has been the 
effect of prohibitions against same-sex marriage on the family and, particularly, on the children of 
                                                 
8 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
9 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 2005), overruled by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
10 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 2695–96 (emphasis added). 
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same-sex couples.13 This Part summarizes how families—gay and straight—have factored into 
this series of judicial decisions that would legalize same-sex marriage. 
 As of this writing, federal district court judges and one federal court of appeals have struck 
down same-sex marriage bans in fourteen different states since the Supreme Court decided 
Windsor.14  The affected states include Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. How family 
has factored into each of these decisions is described below on a state-by-state basis in (largely) 
chronological order. Before undertaking that summary, it is worth noting that when addressing the 
effects of state same-sex marriage bans on same-sex couples with children (or those who wish to 
have children), these courts often cite passages from the Windsor decision—even though that case 
arose in the context of the federal government’s denial of the estate tax marital deduction to a 
surviving same-sex spouse in a couple with no children. Yet, providing fodder for the ensuing 
decisions regarding state same-sex marriage bans, the Windsor Court several times observed the 
importance of marriage not only to same-sex couples but also to their children.15 Most strikingly, 
the Court stated of DOMA: 
The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the 
Constitution protects and whose relationship the State has sought to dignify. And it 
                                                 
13 In 2012, 11.4% of male same-sex couples had children in their household and 24.3% of female 
same-sex couples had children in their household. American Community Survey Data on Same Sex 
Couples: Characteristics of Same-Sex Couple Households, 2012, at tbl.1, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html (last visited May 30, 2014); see Anthony C. 
Infanti, Taxing Civil Rights Gains, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 319, 343–47 (2010) (urging a shift 
in the focus of legal arguments away from same-sex couples and onto lesbian and gay families and 
explaining some of the opposition to such a move). 
14 In addition, state court judges have struck down four states’ same-sex marriage bans since the 
Windsor decision. An Arkansas Circuit Court judge struck down that state’s same-sex marriage 
ban on what appears to be a combination of federal and state constitutional grounds. Wright v. 
Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 2d Div. May 9, 2014). A New Jersey Superior Court 
judge and the New Mexico Supreme Court struck down their states’ same-sex marriage bans on 
state constitutional grounds. Garden State Equality v. Dow, 434 N.J. Super. 163 (2013); Griego v. 
Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013). A Colorado District Court judge struck down that state’s same-
sex marriage ban on federal constitutional grounds, largely quoting from and echoing the federal 
court decisions described in the text below. Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-CV-32572 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
Adams Cnty. July 9, 2014), available at 
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/17th_Judicial_District/Adams/brink
man%20sj%20order%20july%209%20final%2007%2014.pdf.  
15 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (“Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws of New York 
came to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm their 
commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their community.” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 2695 (“DOMA also brings financial harm to children of same-sex 
couples. … And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and 
parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security.”); id. at 2696 (“DOMA instructs all 
federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own 
children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.” (emphasis added)). 
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humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The 
law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in 
their community and in their daily lives.16 
As we will see, all of the recent federal court decisions have picked up and reaffirmed this theme 
in both similar and different ways. 
 A. UTAH  
 In a challenge to the Utah same-sex marriage ban, the opponents of same-sex marriage 
argued that same-sex couples are not qualified to marry—and, therefore, do not have a fundamental 
right to marry—because they cannot “naturally reproduce with each other.”17 In rejecting this 
argument, the court noted an interesting exchange occasioned by the natural extension of this 
argument to postmenopausal women and infertile men: 
At oral argument, the State attempted to distinguish post-menopausal women from 
gay men and lesbians by arguing that older women were more likely to find 
themselves in the position of caring for a grandchild or other relative. But the State 
fails to recognize that many same-sex couples are also in the position of raising a 
child, perhaps through adoption or surrogacy. The court sees no support for the 
State’s suggestion that same-sex couples are interested only in a “consent-based” 
approach to marriage, in which marriage focuses on the strong emotional 
attachment and sexual attraction of the two partners involved. Like opposite-sex 
couples, same-sex couples may decide to marry partly or primarily for the benefits 
and support that marriage can provide to the children the couple is raising or plans 
to raise. Same-sex couples are just as capable of providing support for future 
generations as opposite-sex couples, grandparents, or other caregivers.18 
 When the court reached its equal protection analysis, the focus once again returned to 
procreation and child rearing: “[T]he State argues that its extension of marriage benefits to 
opposite-sex couples promotes certain governmental interests such as responsible procreation and 
optimal child-rearing that would not be furthered if marriage benefits were extended to same-sex 
couples.”19 Applying rational-basis review, not only did the court find a lack of any rational 
relationship between the state’s goals and its ban on same-sex marriage, but it also found the ban 
to be at odds with the state’s purported aim of benefiting children because the ban did nothing 
more than ensure that the many children being raised by same-sex couples would actually be 
harmed both psychologically and financially.20 Interestingly, the court also noted the harm to the 
children of both different-sex and same-sex couples who are lesbian or gay “and who will grow 
up with the knowledge that the State does not believe they are as capable of creating a family as 
                                                 
16 Id. at 2694 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
17 Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1201 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. 
2014). 
18 Id. at 1201–02 (citation omitted). 
19 Id. at 1210. 
20 Id. at 1211–12. 
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their heterosexual friends.”21 
 A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision. 22  It, too, rejected the argument that same-sex couples do not share the 
fundamental right to marry because they cannot naturally procreate, 23  observing that raising 
children (rather than creating children) has been “a key factor in the inviolability of marital and 
familial choices.”24 Because Utah’s same-sex marriage ban implicated the fundamental right to 
marry, the Tenth Circuit majority opinion applied strict scrutiny in determining whether the ban 
passed constitutional muster.25  
 On appeal, the opponents of same-sex marriage offered the following four justifications in 
support of the ban:  
They contend it furthers the state’s interests in: (1) “fostering a child-centric 
marriage culture that encourages parents to subordinate their own interests to the 
needs of their children”; (2) “children being raised by their biological mothers and 
fathers—or at least by a married mother and father—in a stable home”; (3) 
“ensuring adequate reproduction”; and (4) “accommodating religious freedom and 
reducing the potential for civic strife.”26  
The Tenth Circuit majority assumed that all three of the procreation/child-rearing justifications 
were compelling.27 Nevertheless, the court found “a mismatch” between prohibiting same-sex 
couples from marrying and furthering these presumably compelling interests, which “is precisely 
the type of imprecision prohibited by heightened scrutiny.”28 The Tenth Circuit majority “agree[d] 
with the numerous cases decided since Windsor that it is wholly illogical to believe that state 
recognition of the love and commitment between same-sex couples will alter the most intimate 
and personal decisions of opposite-sex couples.”29 The court further found that “a prohibition on 
same-sex marriage is not narrowly tailored toward the goal of encouraging gendered parenting 
styles. The state does not restrict the right to marry or its recognition of marriage based on 
compliance with any set of parenting roles, or even parenting quality.”30 The court additionally 
found that the arguments in support of the ban were undercut by the “palpable harm” that the ban 
causes to the children of same-sex couples, heavily drawing from the Supreme Court’s 
condemnation of this harm in Windsor in reaching this conclusion.31 
 The Tenth Circuit dissent rejected the application of heightened scrutiny to the Utah same-
                                                 
21 Id. at 1213. 
22  Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014), available at 
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4178.pdf.  
23 Id. at 27–35. 
24 Id. at 33. 
25 Id. at 42. 
26 Id. at 43. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 44. 
29 Id. at 51. 
30 Id. at 54. 
31 Id. at 57–58. 
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sex marriage ban.32 In its opinion, the dissent focused on the rationales for the ban offered in the 
district court, which also largely focused on procreation and child rearing and included “(1) 
encouraging responsible procreation given the unique ability of opposite-gender couples to 
conceive, (2) effective parenting to benefit the offspring, and (3) proceeding with caution insofar 
as altering and expanding the definition of marriage.” 33  The dissent concluded that these 
justifications were sufficient for the ban to survive the highly deferential rational-basis review.34  
 The dissent asserted that “[i]t is biologically undeniable that opposite-gender marriage has 
a procreative potential that same-gender marriage lacks. The inherent differences between the 
biological sexes are permissible legislative considerations, and indeed distinguish gender from 
those classifications that warrant strict scrutiny.”35 The dissent further observed that procreation is 
a legitimate consideration in regulating marriage, even if other concerns are sometimes also taken 
into account.36 Moreover, the dissent stated: 
[T]he State has an important interest in ensuring the wellbeing of resulting offspring, 
be they planned or unplanned. To that end, the State can offer marriage and its 
benefits to encourage unmarried parents to marry and married parents to remain so. 
Thus, the State could seek to limit the marriage benefit to opposite- gender couples 
completely apart from history and tradition. Far more opposite-gender couples will 
produce and care for children than same-gender couples and perpetuation of the 
species depends upon procreation. Consistent with the greatest good for the greatest 
number, the State could rationally and sincerely believe that children are best raised 
by two parents of opposite gender (including their biological parents) and that the 
present arrangement provides the best incentive for that outcome. Accordingly, the 
State could seek to preserve the clarity of what marriage represents and not extend 
it. 37 
Against this background, the dissent concluded that “the State’s position is (at the very least) 
arguable. It most certainly is not arbitrary, irrational, or based upon legislative facts that no 
electorate or legislature could conceivably believe.”38 
 B. OHIO  
 In an “as-applied” challenge to the Ohio same-sex marriage ban that concerned only the 
inclusion of information relating to same-sex marriages on death certificates, one of the 
justifications that the court considered was “that children are best off when raised by a mother and 
father.” 39  The court rejected this justification, along with all others, as lacking any rational 
connection with a ban on same-sex marriage.40 Indeed, the court pointed out that “[t]he only effect 
                                                 
32 Id. at 14 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 13; see id. at 14 n.2. 
34 Id. at 15–16. 
35 Id. at 16. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 16–17. 
38 Id. at 20. 
39 Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 994 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 
40 Id. at 995. 
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the [same-sex marriage] bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex 
couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married.”41  
 A few months later, the same judge considered a facial challenge to the Ohio same-sex 
marriage ban in a case that concerned the completion of birth certificates for three lesbian couples 
procreating through artificial insemination and a gay couple adopting a child born in Ohio.42 
Relying upon its earlier determination that “Ohio enacted the marriage recognition bans with 
discriminatory animus and without a single legitimate justification,”43 the federal district court 
found that the Ohio same-sex marriage ban is “facially unconstitutional and unenforceable in all 
circumstances.”44 Of particular importance here, the federal district court found that the Ohio 
same-sex marriage ban violates the fundamental rights of parents to care for and control their 
children.45 The court also focused its equal protection analysis on the birth certificate situation 
before it and on the particular harms that the same-sex marriage ban visits upon the children of 
same-sex couples:  
Defendants’ discriminatory conduct most directly affects the children of same-sex 
couples, subjecting these children to harms spared the children of opposite-sex 
married parents. Ohio refuses to give legal recognition to both parents of these 
children, based on the State’s disapproval of their same-sex relationships. 
Defendants withhold accurate birth certificates from these children, burdening the 
children because their parents are not the opposite-sex married couples who receive 
the State’s special stamp of approval. The Supreme Court has long held that 
disparate treatment of children based on disapproval of their parents’ status or 
conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause.46 
Moreover, in reaffirming its earlier equal protection analysis, the court reiterated that it had already 
“analyzed and roundly rejected any claimed government justifications based on a preference for 
procreation or childrearing by heterosexual couples.”47 Indeed, the court found that “child welfare 
concerns weigh exclusively in favor of recognizing the marital rights of same-sex couples.”48 
 C. OKLAHOMA 
 In a challenge to the same-sex marriage ban in the Oklahoma state constitution, the 
opponents of same-sex marriage offered the following justifications:  
(1) encouraging responsible procreation and child-rearing; (2) steering naturally 
procreative relationships into stable unions; (3) promoting “the ideal that children 
be raised by both a mother and a father in a stable family unit;” and (4) avoiding a 
redefinition of marriage that would “necessarily change the institution and could 
                                                 
41 Id. at 995–96. 
42 Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014). 
43 Id. at *6. 
44 Id. at *7. 
45 Id. at *9, *13. 
46 Id. at *15 (emphasis omitted). 
47 Id. at *16. 
48 Id. 
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have serious unintended consequences.”49 
As elucidated, all four of these justifications directly related to procreation and the rearing of 
children.50 After examining each of these justifications in turn, the court concluded that their link 
with prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying was so attenuated as to cause the marriage ban 
to fail rational-basis review.51 Importantly, in the course of its examination, the court pointed out 
that the first two justifications, which it considered together: 
“make[] no sense” because a same-sex couple’s inability to “naturally procreate” is 
not a biological distinction of critical importance, in relation to the articulated goal 
of avoiding children being born out of wedlock. The reality is that same-sex couples, 
while not able to “naturally procreate,” can and do have children by other means. 
As of the 2010 United States Census, there were 1,280 same-sex “households” in 
Oklahoma who reported as having “their own children under 18 years of age 
residing in their household.” If a same-sex couple is capable of having a child with 
or without a marriage relationship, and the articulated state goal is to reduce 
children born outside of a marital relationship, the challenged exclusion hinders 
rather than promotes that goal.52 
 About six months later, the same panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
that affirmed the federal district court decision striking down Utah’s same-sex marriage ban 
likewise upheld this federal district court decision striking down the same-sex marriage ban in 
Oklahoma’s state constitution.53 The majority and dissenting opinions largely relied upon the 
earlier decision in the Utah case, describe above.54 The opponents of same-sex marriage did, 
however, raise one different argument, namely that “children have an interest in being raised by 
their biological parents.”55 The majority of the court found that the same-sex marriage ban fails to 
be narrowly tailored to the interest too, in light of both “numerous laws that result in children being 
raised by individuals other than their biological parents” and the ability of infertile different-sex 
couples to marry.56  
                                                 
49 Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1290 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, 
___ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Defendant Sally Howe Smith’s Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 38).  
50 Id. at 1290–95. 
51 Id. at 1295–96. It is worth noting that the court only addressed the portion of the ban that affected 
the ability of same-sex couples to marry in Oklahoma. Due to a lack of standing, the court did not 
reach the question of whether the portion of the ban that prohibited the recognition of out-of-state 
same-sex marriages would pass constitutional muster. Id. at 1272–73. 
52 Id. at 1292 (citation omitted). 
53  Bishop v. Smith, No. 14-5003 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014), available at 
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-5003.pdf. The Tenth Circuit likewise did not 
consider the constitutionality of the portion of the ban that applied to same-sex couples married 
out-of-state. Id. at 18–46. 
54 Id. at 14; id. at 8 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see supra notes 22–38 and accompanying text. 
55 Bishop, No. 14-5003, at 16 (majority opinion). 
56 Id. at 16–17. 
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 D. KENTUCKY  
 In a challenge to the application of the Kentucky same-sex marriage ban to couples married 
out of state, the proffered justifications for the ban included tradition and, as suggested by amicus 
curiae, “responsible procreation and childrearing, steering naturally procreative relationships into 
stable unions, promoting the optimal childrearing environment, and proceeding with caution when 
considering changes in how the state defines marriage.” 57  The court noted that the State of 
Kentucky, “not surprisingly, declined to offer [the latter] justifications, as each has failed rational 
basis review in every court to consider them post-Windsor, and most courts pre-Windsor.”58 The 
court further noted, “Kentucky allows gay and lesbian individuals to adopt children. And no one 
has offered evidence that same-sex couples would be any less capable of raising children or any 
less faithful in their marriage vows.”59 
 A few months later, the same federal district court considered a related challenge to the 
application of the Kentucky same-sex marriage ban to couples wishing to marry in Kentucky. In 
striking down the ban, the court declined to find that the case implicated the fundamental right to 
marry, believing that this “would be a dramatic step that the Supreme Court has not yet indicated 
a willingness to take.” 60  Instead, the court found the Kentucky’s same-sex marriage ban 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, concluding that it could not survive rational basis 
review let alone the heightened scrutiny that should apply in light of the court’s decision that 
homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class.61  
 The only justification proffered in support of the ban was “encouraging, promoting, and 
supporting the formation of relationships that have the natural ability to procreate.”62 Given the 
difficulty that opponents of same-sex marriage earlier encountered in offering procreation-related 
justifications for the same-sex marriage ban, the state “add[ed] a disingenuous twist to the 
argument: traditional marriages contribute to a stable birth rate which, in turn, ensures the state’s 
long-term economic stability.” 63  The court summarily dismissed this justification and the 
“disingenuous twist”:  
These arguments are not those of serious people. Though it seems almost 
unnecessary to explain, here are the reasons why. Even assuming the state has a 
legitimate interest in promoting procreation, the Court fails to see, and Defendant 
never explains, how the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage has any effect 
whatsoever on procreation among heterosexual spouses. Excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage does not change the number of heterosexual couples who 
choose to get married, the number who choose to have children, or the number of 
                                                 
57 Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *7–8 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014). 
58 Id. at *8. 
59 Id. 
60 Love v. Beshear, No. No. 3:13–CV–750–H, 2014 WL 2957671, at *5 (W.D. Ky. July 1, 
2014). 
61 Id. at **6–7. 
62 Id. at *8. 
63 Id. 
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children they have.64 
 E. VIRGINIA  
 In a challenge to Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban, opponents of same-sex marriage 
offered three justifications in support of the ban: “(1) tradition; (2) federalism; and (3) ‘responsible 
procreation’ and ‘optimal child rearing.’ ”65 Both the first and the third of these justifications 
implicated children and the family. With regard to the first, promoting tradition was argued to be 
a means of protecting children from being taught that same-sex relationships are equivalent to 
different-sex marriages and of preventing both the institution of marriage and the status of children 
from being devalued.66 With regard to the third justification (i.e., responsible procreation and 
optimal child rearing), the court found: 
This rationale fails under the applicable strict scrutiny test as well as a rational-
basis review. Of course the welfare of our children is a legitimate state interest. 
However, limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails to further this interest. 
Instead, needlessly stigmatizing and humiliating children who are being raised by 
the loving couples targeted by Virginia’s Marriage Laws betrays that interest.67 
The court later added that “[t]he ‘for-the-children’ rationale rests upon an unconstitutional, hurtful 
and unfounded presumption that same-sex couples cannot be good parents.”68 The court also 
rejected the related argument that same-sex and different-sex couples are not similarly situated for 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause because the “the Commonwealth’s primary purpose for 
recognizing and regulating marriage is responsible procreation and child-rearing.”69 The court 
found this argument to be inconsistent with earlier rationalizations of the Virginia same-sex 
marriage ban, which stated that marriage should be limited to different-sex couples regardless of 
whether those couples procreate.70 
 F. TEXAS  
 In a challenge to the Texas same-sex marriage ban, the opponents of same-sex marriage 
offered only two justifications for the ban: “(1) to increase the likelihood that a mother and a father 
will be in charge of childrearing; and (2) to encourage stable family environments for responsible 
procreation.” 71  The court found that these justifications could not save the Texas same-sex 
marriage ban, even on rational-basis review, both because the court denied the asserted link 
between marriage and procreation and because the marriage ban “causes needless stigmatization 
and humiliation for children being raised by the loving same-sex couples being targeted.”72 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 473 (E.D. Va. 2014).  
66 Id. at 474. 
67 Id. at 478. 
68 Id. at 479. 
69 Id. at 480. 
70 Id. at 481. 
71 De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 653 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
72 Id. at 653, 654. 
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 G. TENNESSEE  
 In a challenge to the Tennessee same-sex marriage ban as it applied to six same-sex couples 
who married before moving to Tennessee, a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction 
after finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits.73 In assessing the plaintiffs’ 
likelihood of success, the court summarized the justifications offered by the opponents of same-
sex marriage in support of the ban: 
With respect to the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause challenge, the defendants 
offer arguments that other federal courts have already considered and have 
consistently rejected, such as the argument that notions of federalism permit 
Tennessee to discriminate against same-sex marriages consummated in other states, 
that Windsor does not bind the states the same way that it binds the federal 
government, and that Anti-Recognition Laws have a rational basis because they 
further a state’s interest in procreation, which is essentially the only “rational basis” 
advanced by the defendants here.74 
 Then, in discussing the harms to the plaintiffs that would be redressed through the issuance 
of an injunction, the court considered not only harms that the plaintiffs themselves would suffer 
but also harms that their children would suffer. The court explained that “there is … an imminent 
risk of potential harm to [the plaintiffs’] children during their developing years from the 
stigmatization and denigration of their family relationship.”75 For a lesbian couple who were 
plaintiffs in the suit, the harms were “particularly compelling” because one of them was pregnant 
and the baby’s birth was imminent.76 If there were “any complications or medical emergencies 
associated with the baby’s birth,” then the other member of the couple would need to be able to 
make medical decisions for her spouse or child and might even encounter difficulty visiting her 
spouse or child in the hospital.77 
 H. MICHIGAN 
 Michigan’s adoption laws permit only singles and married couples to adopt. 78  This 
necessarily prevents both members of an unmarried couple—including all same-sex couples—
from adopting in the state.79 In a challenge to this limitation brought by a same-sex couple, a 
federal district court invited the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a challenge to the 
Michigan same-sex marriage ban, because their injury was actually traceable not to the Michigan 
adoption laws but to their inability to marry due to the state’s ban on same-sex marriage.80 The 
plaintiffs amended their complaint as suggested by the court, and, after denying both a motion to 
dismiss and cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held a trial that revolved largely 
                                                 
73 Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159, 2014 WL 997525, at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014). 
74 Id. at *6. 
75 Id. at *7. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 710.24 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2014, No. 150, 153–168, of the 
2014 Regular Session, 97th Legislature). 
79 DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
80 Id. 
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around the social science research regarding the outcomes of children raised by same-sex parents.81 
 At trial, the opponents of same-sex marriage offered the following justifications in support 
of the Michigan same-sex marriage ban: “(1) providing an optimal environment for child rearing; 
(2) proceeding with caution before altering the traditional definition of marriage; and (3) upholding 
tradition and morality.”82 With regard to the first justification, the court outright rejected the expert 
testimony offered by the opponents of same-sex marriage and accepted that offered in support of 
legally recognizing same-sex marriage.83 The court found, among other things, that there was no 
support for the notion that children raised by same-sex couples have worse outcomes than children 
raised by different-sex couples, that there is no rational relationship between the optimal child-
rearing justification and the state’s same-sex marriage ban, and that the ban “actually fosters the 
potential for childhood destabilization” especially when the legally recognized parent dies and the 
non–legally recognized parent must pursue a long and complicated guardianship proceeding to 
gain custody of the child.84 
 It is worth quoting at length from the court’s opinion explaining its outright rejection of 
Mark Regnerus’s expert testimony offered at trial in support of the same-sex marriage ban. 
Opponents of same-sex marriage had hoped that Regnerus’s testimony and the study upon which 
it was based would help them to turn the tide after a series of judicial and legislative setbacks, 
permitting them to win not only this case but also future same-sex marriage litigation:85 
 The Court finds Regnerus’s testimony entirely unbelievable and not worthy 
of serious consideration. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that his 2012 
“study” was hastily concocted at the behest of a third-party funder, which found it 
“essential that the necessary data be gathered to settle the question in the forum of 
public debate about what kinds of family arrangement are best for society” and 
which “was confident that the traditional understanding of marriage will be 
vindicated by this study.” In the funder’s view, “the future of the institution of 
marriage at this moment is very uncertain” and “proper research” was needed to 
counter the many studies showing no differences in child outcomes. The funder 
also stated that “this is a project where time is of the essence.” Time was of the 
essence at the time of the funder’s comments in April 2011, and when Dr. Regnerus 
published … in 2012, because decisions such as Perry v. Schwarzenegger and 
Windsor v. United States were threatening the funder’s concept of “the institution 
of marriage.” 
 While Regnerus maintained that the funding source did not affect his 
impartiality as a researcher, the Court finds this testimony unbelievable. The funder 
clearly wanted a certain result, and Regnerus obliged. Additionally, the [study] is 
flawed on its face, as it purported to study “a large, random sample of American 
young adults (ages 18–39) who were raised in different types of family 
                                                 
81 Id. at 760–68. 
82 Id. at 770. 
83 Id. at 770–71. 
84 Id. at 770–72. 
85 Erik Eckholm, Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage Take Bad-for-Children Argument to Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2014, at A16.  
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arrangements” (emphasis added), but in fact it did not study this at all, as Regnerus 
equated being raised by a same-sex couple with having ever lived with a parent 
who had a “romantic relationship with someone of the same sex” for any length of 
time. Whatever Regnerus may have found in this “study,” he certainly cannot 
purport to have undertaken a scholarly research effort to compare the outcomes of 
children raised by same-sex couples with those of children raised by heterosexual 
couples. It is no wonder that the [study] has been widely and severely criticized by 
other scholars, and that Regnerus’s own sociology department at the University of 
Texas has distanced itself from the [study] in particular and Dr. Regnerus’s views 
in general and reaffirmed the … APA [American Psychological Association] 
position statement.86 
 I. INDIANA  
 In a challenge to the Indiana same-sex marriage ban, a federal district court judge granted 
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from enforcing the ban against a same-sex couple 
who had married in Massachusetts, where one of the spouses had ovarian cancer and her death was 
imminent.87 In assessing the likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail on the merits in their facial 
challenge to the ban, the court found that the state interests asserted in support of the ban, which 
centered on procreation and child rearing, were no more likely to survive rational-basis review in 
this case than they had been in the mounting number of district court decisions around the country 
striking down state bans on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional.88 
 Weeks later, the same court struck down the Indiana same-sex marriage ban as facially 
violating the Constitution.89 In analyzing the due process challenge to the ban, the court applied 
strict scrutiny to the ban because it infringes upon the fundamental right to marry.90 The only 
justification offered in support of the ban was the state’s interest “in encouraging the couple to 
stay together for the sake of any unintended children that their sexual union may create.”91 Even 
assuming that this is an important interest, the court found that the state’s marriage laws were not 
“ ‘closely tailored’ to that interest” because Indiana law is both overinclusive (by prohibiting 
certain different-sex couples who can accidentally procreate from marrying because of their 
consanguinity) and underinclusive (by failing to prohibit different-sex couples who cannot or do 
not wish to procreate from marrying).92 The court undertook an independent equal protection 
analysis, applying rational-basis review because sexual-orientation-based classifications are not 
yet subjected to heightened scrutiny in the Seventh Circuit.93 Ultimately, the court concluded that 
                                                 
86 DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 766 (citations omitted). 
87 Baskin v. Bogan, No. 1:14-CV-00355-RLY-TAB, 2014 WL 1814064, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 8, 
2014). 
88 Id. at *3–4. 
89  Baskin v. Bogan, No. 1:14-CV-00355-RLY-TAB (S.D. Ind. June 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.jconline.com/story/news/2014/06/25/court-fuling-indiana-same-sex-marriage-
documents/11358567/.  
90 Id. at 20. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 20–21. 
93 Id. at 22, 24. 
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“[t]he connection between these rights and responsibilities and the ability to conceive 
unintentionally is too attenuated to support such a broad prohibition.”94 
 J. IDAHO 
 In a challenge to the Idaho same-sex marriage ban, the primary justification that opponents 
of same-sex marriage offered in support of the ban “relate[d] to the State’s interest in maximizing 
child welfare.”95 However, the court ultimately found that, “[f]ailing to shield Idaho’s children in 
any rational way, Idaho’s Marriage Laws fall on the sword they wield against same-sex couples 
and their families.”96 Another proffered justification likewise focused on child welfare, with the 
opponents of same-sex marriage arguing that the state was marshaling its limited resources by 
restricting marriage to different-sex couples because of their natural procreative ability.97 This 
justification failed, too, because it was simultaneously overinclusive—providing access to 
government resources to different-sex couples who cannot or do not wish to procreate—and 
underinclusive—withholding access to government resources from same-sex couples with 
children.98 
 K. OREGON 
 In a challenge to the Oregon same-sex marriage ban, the defendants offered two 
justifications in support of the ban: (1) tradition and (2) “protecting children and encouraging 
stable families.”99 The court found that only the second justification constituted a legitimate state 
interest.100 Despite its finding that “protecting children and promoting stable families is certainly 
a legitimate governmental interest, the state’s marriage laws do not advance this interest—they 
harm it.”101  
 The court found support for its conclusion in the existence of domestic partnerships in 
Oregon, which were created in part to promote the stability of same-sex couples with children yet 
were recognized by the legislature as a lesser legal status than marriage.102 This lesser status did 
nothing more than “burden, demean, and harm gay and lesbian couples and their families so long 
as [the state’s] current marriage laws [stood].”103  And given the state’s professed interest in 
protecting all children, as expressed in its laws, the court failed to see the link between the same-
sex marriage ban and the protection of children drawn by the defendants.104 Indeed, the court noted 
that “[t]he realization that same-gender couples make just as good parents as opposite-gender 
couples is supported by more than just common sense; it is also supported by ‘the vast majority of 
                                                 
94 Id. at 28. 
95 Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999, at *21 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014). 
96 Id. at *24. 
97 Id. at *24–25. 
98 Id. at *25. 
99 Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 6:13–CV–01834–MC, 2014 WL 2054264, at *9 (D. Or. May 19, 2014). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at *11. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at *12. 
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scientific studies’ examining the issue.”105 The court further failed to see the relationship between 
the same-sex marriage ban and responsible procreation: “A couple who has had an unplanned child 
has, by definition, given little thought to the outcome of their actions. The fact that their lesbian 
neighbors got married in the month prior to conception seems of little import to the stork that is 
flying their way.” 106  Nor did the court find any relationship between the ban and “natural” 
procreation in light of “[t]he state’s interest … in a child’s well-being regardless of the means of 
conception.”107 
 L. PENNSYLVANIA 
 In a challenge to the Pennsylvania same-sex marriage ban, opponents of same-sex marriage 
offered the following justifications in support of the ban: “the promotion of procreation, child-
rearing and the well-being of children, tradition, and economic protection of Pennsylvania 
businesses.”108 Nevertheless, the opponents of same-sex marriage actually “defend[ed] only the 
first two aims, stating that numerous federal and state courts have agreed that responsible 
procreation and child-rearing are legitimate state interests and providing extensive authority for 
that proposition.”109 Yet, applying heightened scrutiny, the court found that the state’s marriage 
ban “is not substantially related to an important governmental interest.”110 In describing the facts 
underlying its decision, the court described at great length the difficulties encountered by the 
plaintiff couples with children: 
For those couples who have had children, like Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson, 
the non-biological parent has had to apply for a second-parent adoption. Dawn 
expresses that she and Diana are presently saving money so that she can legally 
adopt their second son, J.P. Until the adoption is complete, she has no legal ties to 
J.P., despite that, together, she and Diana dreamed of welcoming him to their family, 
prepared for his birth, and functioned as a married couple long before having him. 
Christine Donato, who together with Sandy Ferlanie completed a second-parent 
adoption in similar circumstances, describes the process as “long, expensive, and 
humiliating.” The couples choosing to adopt, like Fernando Chang-Muy and Len 
Rieser, had to undergo a two-step process, incurring double the costs, in which one 
became their child’s legal parent and, later, the other petitioned for a second-parent 
adoption. For the children of these couples, it can be difficult to understand why 
their parents are not married or recognized as married. In the words of Deb 
Whitewood [one of the plaintiffs], “It sends the message to our children that their 
family is less deserving of respect and support than other families. That’s a hurtful 
message.”111 
 M. WISCONSIN 
                                                 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at *13. 
107 Id. 
108 Whitewood v. Wolf, No. 1:13-CV-1861, 2014 WL 2058105, at *15 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at *2. 
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 In a challenge to Wisconsin’s same-sex marriage ban, the federal district court rejected 
arguments made by the ban’s supporters that “marriage’s link to procreation is the sole reason that 
the Supreme Court has concluded that marriage is protected by the Constitution.”112 In defense of 
the ban, its supporters offered the following set of justifications: “(1) preserving tradition; (2) 
encouraging procreation generally and ‘responsible’ procreation in particular; (3) providing an 
environment for ‘optimal child rearing’; (4) protecting the institution of marriage; (5) proceeding 
with caution; and (6) helping to maintain other legal restrictions on marriage.”113 Most of these 
justifications ended up revolving around or implicating procreation and child rearing.  
 With regard to the second justification, the court, which applied heightened scrutiny, found 
it difficult to lend the procreation and “responsible” procreation arguments any credence, 
especially given that Wisconsin does sanction a particular form of marriage (i.e., between first 
cousins) only if the couple affirms its inability to reproduce.114  
 With regard to the third justification, the court found a lack of connection between the 
same-sex marriage ban and providing an optimal environment for child rearing; it also found this 
argument to be inconsistent with the “responsible” procreation argument, which is based on the 
notion that same-sex couples do not need marriage to be responsible parents because they cannot 
procreate accidentally.115 Moreover, the court found that “the most immediate effect that the same-
sex marriage ban has on children is to foster less than optimal results for children of same-sex 
parents by stigmatizing them and depriving them of the benefits that marriage could provide.”116 
This “failure to consider the interests of part of the very group” that the law purportedly was 
intended to protect was only “further evidence of the law’s invalidity.”117 
 With regard to the fourth and fifth justifications (i.e., protecting the institution of marriage 
and proceeding with caution), supporters of the ban maintained their focus on children and argued 
that they feared that opening marriage to same-sex couples would shift marriage from a “ ‘child-
centric’ ” to an “ ‘adult-centric’ ” institution.118 In addition, opening marriage to same-sex couples 
would, according to the supporters of the ban, result in “ ‘confusion of social roles linked with 
marriage and parenting.’ ”119 The court doubted that protecting the institution of marriage in this 
way would be considered a legitimate state interest, but, even so, the court failed to find a 
connection between the same-sex marriage ban and the fears raised by the supporters of the ban.120 
 N. COLORADO 
 In the most cursory of the decisions regarding state same-sex marriage bans, a federal 
                                                 
112  Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-CV-64-BBC, at 27 (W.D. Wis. June 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/228494508/3-14-cv-00064-118. 
113 Id. at 63. 
114 Id. at 70–74. 
115 Id. at 75–76. 
116 Id. at 77. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 78 (quoting Defendants’ Brief at 57). 
119 Id. (quoting Lynn Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same–Sex Marriage in 
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 799 (2001)). 
120 Id. at 79–81. 
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district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Colorado’s same-sex 
marriage ban but stayed that injunction pending the outcome of the petition for writ of certiorari 
in Kitchen v. Herbert, which is the pending challenge to the Utah same-sex marriage ban.121 
Because the defendants, who presented “a far from united front,” did not oppose issuance of a 
preliminary injunction, the court engaged in a very limited analysis in its opinion.122 Indeed, the 
court did not even enumerate—let alone delve into—the justifications proffered in support of the 
ban; rather, the court relied entirely upon the opinions in the two cases already decided by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in finding that a preliminary injunction should be issued 
prohibiting enforcement of the Colorado same-sex marriage ban.123 
* * * * 
 Notwithstanding that all of these decisions formally addressed only the ability of same-sex 
couples to marry, an important common thread running through all of the cases is procreation and 
child rearing—a thread that was weaved into the arguments of both supporters and opponents of 
same-sex marriage. Indeed, in several of the suits, the children of the same-sex couples challenging 
these state same-sex marriage bans were also named plaintiffs.124 In the end, all of these federal 
judges picked up the thread of procreation and child rearing and weaved it into their decisions. In 
their decisions, the courts ultimately considered not only the legal rights of the same-sex couples 
themselves but also the importance of relationship recognition to their children (current, expected, 
or contemplated). They rejected heteronormative arguments that procreation and child rearing can 
and should take place only in the context of different-sex (preferably married) couples. And they 
affirmatively validated same-sex couples as appropriate and acceptable parents.  
III. REVENUE RULING 2013-17 
 Following the Windsor decision, the federal government acted quickly to issue guidance to 
same-sex couples. In August 2013, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17, which is its principal 
guidance on the application of the Windsor decision to the federal tax laws.125 That revenue ruling 
is best known for its adoption of a generous “place of celebration” rule (instead of a less generous 
“place of residence” or “place of domicile” rule) for purposes of determining which same-sex 
marriages will be respected for federal tax purposes.126 Less well known, however, is that the 
                                                 
121 Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-CV-01817-RM-KLM, at 2 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014), available 
at http://cdn.lgbtqnation.com/assets/2014/07/Colo-Burns-v-Hickenlooper-ruling.pdf; see supra 
notes 17–38 and accompanying text. 
122 Burns, No. 14-CV-01817-RM-KLM, at 2–3. 
123 Id. at 4–5. 
124 Baskin v. Bogan, No. 1:14-CV-00355-RLY-TAB, 2014 WL 1814064, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 8, 
2014); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014); 
Whitewood v. Wolf, No. 1:13-CV-1861, 2014 WL 2058105, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014). 
125 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
126 Id. at 203–04. For a discussion of the problems with this guidance and the open questions that 
it has left regarding which same-sex marriages will be recognized for federal tax purposes, see 
Infanti, Moonscape, supra note 7, and Infanti, Big (Gay) Love, supra note 7. 
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ruling also addressed the application of the gendered spousal provisions in the Internal Revenue 
Code (Code) to married same-sex couples.127 
 In Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the IRS had little trouble concluding that, when used in the 
Code, gender-neutral terms such as “marriage” and “spouse” would clearly encompass same-sex 
marriages and same-sex spouses following the Windsor decision.128 In fact, the IRS stated that 
“[t]his is the most natural reading of those terms; it is consistent with Windsor, in which the 
plaintiff was seeking tax benefits under a statute that used the term ‘spouse,’ and a narrower 
interpretation would not further the purposes of efficient tax administration.”129 But there are more 
than thirty provisions in the Code that specifically refer and apply to “husband” and “wife” rather 
than to “spouses.” 130  A search of Treasury Regulations interpreting the Code for specific 
                                                 
127 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 2, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 202–03. 
128 Id. at 202. 
129 Id. (citation omitted). 
130 I.R.C. §§ 21(d)(2) (permitting either a husband or wife, but not both, to be deemed gainfully 
employed while a full-time student for purposes of determining the amount of the dependent care 
assistance credit); 22(e)(1) (requiring married taxpayers to file joint returns as a condition of 
claiming the credit for the elderly and disabled); 38(c)(6) (rules for determining limitation on 
general business credit of married taxpayers filing separately); 42(j)(5) (treating husband and wife 
as one partner for purposes of determining whether special rules for recapturing the credit by 
partnerships will apply); 62(b)(3) (requiring married qualified performing artists to file joint 
returns as a condition of taking their unreimbursed business expenses as an above-the-line 
deduction); 121(b)(2), (d)(1) (special rules applicable to husband and wife for purposes of 
determining amount of, and eligibility for, exclusion from gross income for gain on the sale of a 
principal residence); 165(h)(5)(B) (treating husband and wife filing a joint return as a single 
individual for purposes of the limitation on casualty losses); 179(b)(4) (treating husbands and 
wives who file separately as a single taxpayer for purposes of the dollar limitations on elective 
expensing of depreciable assets); 213(d)(8) (applying the rules in § 6013, infra, in determining a 
taxpayer’s marital status for purposes of the deduction for medical expenses); 219(g)(4) (treating 
husbands and wives who live apart and file separate returns as unmarried for purposes of 
determining the limitations on a deduction for retirement savings); 274(b)(2)(B) (treating husband 
and wife as a single taxpayer for purpose of a limitation on the deduction for gifts); 643(f) (treating 
husband and wife as one person for purposes of determining whether to treat multiple trusts as a 
single trust); 682 (alimony trusts); 761(f) (exempting certain joint ventures conducted by husband 
and wife from being treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes); 911(b)(2)(c), (d)(9) 
(respectively, containing special rules for dealing with community income and delegating 
authority to the U.S. Department of Treasury to promulgate rules addressing the situation where 
both a husband and wife have income eligible to be excluded under § 911); 1244(b) (setting the 
amount of ordinary loss that a husband and wife filing a joint return may claim with regard to “§ 
1244 stock”); 1272(a)(2)(E) (antiabuse rule in an exception to the application of the original issue 
discount rules); 1313 (treating husband and wife as related taxpayers for purposes of the provisions 
mitigating the application of the statute of limitations in the case of inconsistent positions taken by 
the taxpayer, a related taxpayer, or the IRS); 1361(c)(1)(A)(i) (treating husband and wife as a 
single shareholder for purposes of the 100-sharedholder limitation on S corporations); 2040(b) 
(special rule for inclusion of jointly held property with a right of survivorship in the gross estate 
of a decedent spouse); 2516 (gift tax treatment of transfers of property incident to divorce); 6013 
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references to “husband” or “wife” turned up nearly 250 regulations with such references in rules 
or examples applying those rules.131 Prior to the Windsor decision, some worried that, even were 
the Supreme Court to strike down section three of DOMA, married same-sex couples would still 
not be treated equally under the Code because they would not be able to take advantage of these 
gendered tax provisions—including, most notably, the provision that permits married couples to 
file a joint return.132 
 Reading the gendered terms “husband” and “wife” in these Code and Treasury Regulations 
sections in a gender-neutral fashion required more explanation and justification than did the 
gender-neutral interpretation of the gender-neutral term “spouse.” To begin, the IRS interpreted 
the Windsor decision as applying broadly to the federal tax laws and not just to the estate tax issue 
presented in that case, which concerned the availability of the estate tax marital deduction to a 
gender-neutral “surviving spouse.” 133  In addition, the IRS worried about the constitutional 
implications of not reading the terms “husband” and “wife” in a gender-neutral fashion: 
The Fifth Amendment analysis in Windsor raises serious doubts about the 
                                                 
(joint federal income tax returns); 6014 (delegating to the U.S. Department of Treasury authority 
to prescribe regulations addressing situations where a husband and wife elect to have the IRS 
compute their taxes for them); 6017 (special rule for computing self-employment taxes);  
6166(b)(2)(B) (attribution rule in provision extending time to pay estate taxes where estate consists 
largely of a closely held business); 6212(b)(2) (detailing ways in which a notice of deficiency may 
be addressed to husbands and wives filing joint returns); 6231(a)(1)(B) (treating husband and wife 
as one person for purposes of determining whether a partnership will be exempted from unified 
audit procedures); 6231(a)(12) (treating a joint partnership interest held by husband and wife as if 
it were held by one person); 7428(c)(2) (treating husband and wife as a single contributor for 
purposes of limiting the circumstances in which a charitable contribution will remain valid despite 
the revocation of an organization’s charitable status); 7701(a)(17) (reading the references in §§ 
682 and 2516, supra, to “husband” and “wife” to include former husbands and former wives and, 
where appropriate, reading the terms “husband” and “wife” interchangeably); 7872(f)(7) (husband 
and wife treated as a single person for purposes of recharacterizing below-market-rate loans) 
(Westlaw current through Pub. L. No. 113-93, excluding Pub. L. No. 113-79, approved Apr. 1, 
2014).  
131 I conducted this search on June 9, 2014 in WestlawNext. I first clicked on “Federal Materials” 
and then on “Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).” In the table of contents, I selected “Title 26–
Internal Revenue” and entered “text(husband or wife)” in the search bar at the top of the page. 
This search returned 247 results that included regulations promulgated under the Code sections 
collected supra note 130 as well as under other Code sections. 
132 E.g., Frank S. Berall, Update on Evolving Legal Status of Same-Sex Marriages, 37 EST. PLAN. 
21, 23–24 (2010); see I.R.C. § 6013(a) (“A husband and wife may make a single return jointly of 
income taxes … even though one of the spouses has neither gross income nor deductions … .”); 
William Stevenson, Nat’l Council for Taxpayer Advocacy, Open Letter to IRS Commissioner and 
Members of Congress, 132 TAX NOTES 203 (2011) (relaying the IRS’s pre-Windsor position that 
same-sex couples were prohibited from filing joint returns not only because of section three of 
DOMA but also because § 6013, by using the terms “husband” and “wife,” limits joint filing to 
married different-sex couples). 
133 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 2, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 202; see I.R.C. § 2056. 
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constitutionality of Federal laws that confer marriage benefits and burdens only on 
opposite-sex married couples. In Windsor, the Court stated that, “[b]y creating two 
contradictory marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex 
couples to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose 
of Federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal 
relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect.” Interpreting the 
gender-specific terms in the Code to categorically exclude same-sex couples 
arguably would have the same effect of diminishing the stability and predictability 
of legally recognized same-sex marriages. Thus, the canon of constitutional 
avoidance counsels in favor of interpreting the gender-specific terms in the Code 
to refer to same-sex spouses and couples.134 
The IRS further concluded that a gender-neutral reading of the terms “husband” and “wife” would 
be consistent with: (1) a provision in the Code that allows these terms to be read interchangeably; 
(2) a provision in the Dictionary Act that requires masculine words to be read as including the 
feminine, unless the context indicates otherwise; and (3) the legislative history of the provision 
permitting joint income tax filing, which appears to use the gendered terms “husband” and “wife” 
interchangeably with the gender-neutral phrase “married taxpayers.”135 Finally, the IRS argued 
that a gender-neutral reading of the terms “husband” and “wife” would both ensure equal treatment 
of similarly situated taxpayers and “foster[] administrative efficiency because the [IRS] does not 
collect or maintain information on the gender of taxpayers.”136 
 The IRS’s reading of these terms is, in my opinion, quite appropriate. Nevertheless, certain 
of its arguments in support of that reading are weak. In particular, the IRS’s arguments regarding 
the gender-neutral interpretation’s consistency with the Code, Dictionary Act, and legislative 
history of the joint return provision ignores the fact that both of these statutory provisions as well 
as the legislative history all date from a time when different-sex marriage was the only legally 
permitted form of marriage.137 If given the opportunity, opponents of same-sex marriage would 
surely argue that the IRS’s interpretation is inconsistent with the understanding of Congress when 
it enacted the relevant statutory provisions and drafted the cited legislative history. The IRS’s 
argument regarding administrative efficiency is also weak because the IRS certainly could collect 
information regarding gender by adding no more than a box on the return in between each spouse’s 
name and Social Security number, where gender could be indicated with a click of the mouse or a 
check mark (for the Luddites among us).138  
 I point these weaknesses out not to undermine the IRS’s interpretation, which is amply 
                                                 
134 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 2, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 202 (citation omitted). 
135  Id. at 202–03; see I.R.C. §§ 6013 (permitting joint filing); 7701(a)(17) (regarding the 
interchangeability of the terms “husband” and “wife”), (p)(1)(3) (referring to 1 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 
2005), which provides that the masculine includes the feminine). 
136 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 2, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203. 
137 Id. (citing a 1951 Senate report as the relevant legislative history of the joint return provision); 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 1, 912 (enacting I.R.C. 
§ 7701(a)(17)); Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-278, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633. 
138 In fact, some academics might be quite pleased at the possibility of being able to study IRS 
statistics of income broken down by taxpayer gender. 
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supported by its other arguments, but to underscore the extent to which the IRS might be viewed 
as taking an aggressive posture in Revenue Ruling 2013-17. In addition to adopting the more 
generous “place of celebration” rule for purposes of determining marital status for federal tax 
purposes,139 the tone of the IRS’s discussion in the section of the ruling regarding the interpretation 
of the gendered terms “husband” and “wife” is persuasive and quasi-adversarial in nature.140 That 
is, it includes every conceivable argument in support of the IRS’s interpretation and makes 
noticeably little mention of counterarguments. To understand how the IRS’s position might have 
been quite different from (i.e., far less generous than) what it was in Revenue Ruling 2013-17, one 
need only imagine the Windsor decision being issued during the administration of a president less 
supportive of same-sex marriage.141 From this perspective, it is clear that the IRS implemented 
and interpreted Windsor as favorably as possible to same-sex couples in order to achieve as gender-
neutral (really as sexual-orientation-neutral)  conceptualization of marriage as possible in the 
federal tax laws.142  
IV. ACCENTUATED HETERONORMATIVITY 
 The heteronormativity of the tax incentives for procreation that we will explore next stands 
in sharp relief against the background sketched in the previous two parts of this essay. In Part II, 
we explored the federal court decisions validating same-sex couples as equally worthy of legal 
recognition and as equally good parents as different-sex couples. Then, in Part III, we witnessed 
how the IRS has done its best to translate this judicial vision into the application and enforcement 
of the federal tax laws by striving for a sexual-orientation-neutral conceptualization of marriage. 
In this Part, we will turn to contrasting these steps toward erasing the legal differences between 
same-sex and different-sex couples with tax incentives that—because of their inherent 
heteronormativity—draw a sharp distinction between these two classes of married couples insofar 
as incentivizing procreation and family formation is concerned.  
 The primary tax incentives for procreation and family formation are the deduction for 
medical expenses, the adoption credit, and the exclusion for employer-provided adoption 
                                                 
139 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
140 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to Barack Obama, U.S. President, at 
2 (June 20, 2014) (“[T]he Department drew on all of its expertise to ensure that the agencies’ 
actions had firm legal support … .”), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9722014620103930904785.pdf 
141 Compare I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2006-08-038 (Feb. 24, 2006) (under the George W. Bush 
administration, opining that the application of California’s community property laws to same-sex 
couples would not be respected for federal tax purposes), with I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2010-
21-050 (May 5, 2010) (under the Obama administration, reversing this position and concluding 
that the application of California’s community property laws to same-sex couples would be 
respected for federal tax purposes). 
142 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., supra note 140, at 1 (“I am pleased to report that agencies 
across the federal government have implemented the Windsor decision to treat married same-sex 
couples the same as married opposite-sex couples for the benefits and obligations for which 
marriage is relevant, to the greatest extent possible under the law.”); id. at 2 (“[T]he policy of this 
Administration has been to recognize lawful same-sex marriages as broadly as possible, to ensure 
equal treatment of for all members of society regardless of sexual orientation.”).  
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assistance 143  In keeping with the focus of this symposium, we will interrogate the 
heteronormativity of these tax incentives through the lens of compensated surrogacy, which may 
be used by different-sex couples, lesbian couples, and single women experiencing fertility 
problems and is the only available option to procreate for gay couples and single men. Before 
proceeding, however, it is worth noting that there are also postbirth tax incentives for children—
like the child credit, the additional personal exemption for dependents, the dependent care 
assistance credit, and the exclusion for employer-provided dependent care assistance.144 These 
postbirth incentives do not, however, relate directly to procreation and family formation but to 
child rearing, which brings them outside the scope of this essay.  
 A. MEDICALIZATION OF PROCREATION 
 The heteronormativity in the tax incentives for procreation and family formation lies in 
their complete medicalization. In operation, the only tax incentive available for procreative activity 
is the deduction for medical expenses. As we will see, the tax incentives for adoption are confined 
to family formation separate and apart from procreation (i.e., they apply to children who have been 
born to one set of parents, given up for adoption, and then adopted by a different parent or parents) 
and are unavailable to those using a surrogate to assist with procreation. Adoption expenses—like 
all other surrogacy-related expenses—are deductible, if at all, as medical expenses. 
 In earlier work examining how the deduction for medical expenses furthers 
heteropatriarchal domination, I have explained at length how the federal tax laws, by viewing 
procreation through a medical lens, proceed on the assumption that couples can “naturally” 
procreate and will only need assistance procreating when there is a medical problem with fertility 
that interferes with the natural procreative process.145 That there might be others—whether same-
                                                 
143 I.R.C. §§ 23, 137, 213 (Westlaw current through Pub. L. No. 113-93, excluding Pub. L. No. 
113-79, approved Apr. 1, 2014). 
144 I.R.C. §§ 21, 24, 129, 151(c). 
145 To summarize with a brief quote: 
 By medicalising procreation as it does, section 213 … always already 
furthers heteropatriarchal domination. … With its construction and corporealisation 
of the body family, section 213 certainly betrays an outsized focus on the traditional 
family model of the taxpayer/husband, wife and dependants. 
 At a more basic level, the patriarchal and heterosexual aspects of this 
domination stem from the unceasing reference to “infertility” treatments. Referring 
to ART [i.e., assisted reproductive technology] as “infertility treatment” conjures 
up the image of a different-sex couple encountering difficulties in getting pregnant. 
But this paints only the most partial of pictures of the groups who use ART to 
procreate. 
 Increasingly, same-sex couples and single men and women (whether 
straight or gay) use ART to create nontraditional families. …  
Anthony C. Infanti, Dismembering Families, in CHALLENGING GENDER INEQUALITY IN TAX 
POLICY MAKING 159, 169–70 (Kim Brooks et al. eds, 2011)  
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sex couples or singles—who need assistance to procreate goes either unnoticed or ignored.146 
  1. Medical Expense Deduction 
 Section 213 is the Code provision that allows taxpayers to deduct medical expenses. This 
provision is aimed at taxpayers who incur such a significant amount of medical expenses that these 
expenses will “affect [their] ability to pay federal income tax.”147 To this end, § 213 allows a 
deduction for “the expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or 
otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent … to the extent that such 
expenses exceed 10 percent of adjusted gross income.”148 As I have noted elsewhere, “assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) such as in vitro fertilization, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, 
and/or surrogacy … can be rather costly and often are not covered by insurance, making them an 
excellent candidate for deduction under section 213 if they qualify as ‘medical care.’ ”149 
 For purposes of § 213, “medical care” is defined in relevant part as “amounts paid for the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any 
structure or function of the body.”150 After reiterating this definition, the Treasury Regulations go 
on to explain: 
Amounts paid for operations or treatments affecting any portion of the body, 
including obstetrical expenses and expenses of therapy or X-ray treatments, are 
deemed to be for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body and 
are therefore paid for medical care. Amounts expended for illegal operations or 
treatments are not deductible. Deductions for expenditures for medical care 
allowable under section 213 will be confined strictly to expenses incurred primarily 
for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness. Thus, 
payments for the following are payments for medical care: hospital services, 
nursing services (including nurses’ board where paid by the taxpayer), medical, 
laboratory, surgical, dental and other diagnostic and healing services, X-rays, 
medicine and drugs … , artificial teeth or limbs, and ambulance hire. However, an 
expenditure which is merely beneficial to the general health of an individual, such 
as an expenditure for a vacation, is not an expenditure for medical care.151 
Historically, there has been some debate about—and vacillation by the IRS over—whether 
expenses associated with reproduction (or the choice not to reproduce) constitute “medical care” 
as defined by the Code and Treasury Regulations.152 In informal guidance, the IRS has indicated 
that “fertility enhancement” expenses (e.g., in vitro fertilization) and even an infertile individual’s 
cost of obtaining an egg donor (including associated legal fees) can qualify as deductible medical 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 160. 
148 I.R.C. § 213(a). 
149 Infanti, supra note 145, at 167. 
150 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A). 
151 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1960). 
152 Tessa Davis, Reproducing Value: How Tax Law Differentially Values Fertility, Sexuality & 
Marriage, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1, 6–12 (2012); Infanti, supra note 145, at 167. 
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expenses.153 The IRS has, however, opposed the deductibility of the cost of a surrogate as a 
medical expense.154 Nevertheless, out of apparent fear of an adverse decision, the IRS did settle 
an early Tax Court case regarding the deductibility of surrogacy expenses in favor of the taxpayers, 
who were a married different-sex couple experiencing significant fertility problems.155  
 In 2008, the Tax Court issued the first judicial opinion regarding the deductibility of 
surrogacy expenses. The case, Magdalin v. Commissioner, involved an admittedly fertile, single 
gay man who procreated with the help of two separate gestational surrogates and who sought to 
deduct expenses relating to the egg donations, the gestational surrogacies, and the legal expenses 
associated with obtaining this assistance in procreating as well as with establishing the parentage 
of his children.156 The Tax Court viewed the medical expense deduction as a narrow exception to 
the general rule that there is no deduction for personal, living, or family expenses and, in keeping 
with the italicized language in the quoted text above, “requir[ed] a causal relationship … between 
a medical condition and the expenditures incurred in treating that condition.”157 The Tax Court 
ultimately denied the taxpayer a deduction for his surrogacy-related expenses because (1) he “had 
no medical condition or defect, such as, for example, infertility, that required treatment or 
mitigation” and (2) the expenses “did not affect a structure or function of his body.”158 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit summarily affirmed the Tax Court’s decision because  
the various expenses incurred by petitioner were not for the treatment of any 
underlying medical condition suffered by the taxpayer; … he stipulated that he was 
not infertile and that his previous children had been produced by natural processes 
                                                 
153 I.R.S. Pub. No. 502, Medical and Dental Expenses 8 (2013) (fertility enhancement expenses); 
I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102, 2005 WL 1564598 (Mar. 29, 2005) (egg donor); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
2003-18-017 (Jan. 9, 2003) (egg donor). 
154 See Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1121, 1160–61 (2004) (describing the IRS’s position in a 1994 Tax Court case that settled 
in favor of the taxpayer). The IRS has continued to take this position since settling that case. E.g., 
I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2004-0187, 2004 WL 2984978 (Sept. 13, 2004); I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2002-0291, 2002 
WL 31991849 (Aug. 12, 2002). 
155  Katherine Pratt, Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment: Implications of Magdalin v. 
Commissioner for Opposite-Sex Couples, Gay and Lesbian Same-Sex Couples, and Single Women 
and Men, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1306 (“After the emotional testimony of Mrs. Sedgwick in 
which she recounted the sad story of her years of unsuccessful fertility treatment, counsel met with 
Judge Jacobs in his chambers. After the meeting, the case settled in favor of the Sedgwicks. 
Presumably, the IRS settled to avoid an adverse decision in the case.”). 
156 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491, 491 (2008), aff’d, 2010-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 50,150 (1st Cir. 2009). 
157 Id. at 492; see I.R.C. § 262 (Westlaw current through Pub. L. No. 113-93, excluding Pub. L. 
No. 113-79, approved Apr. 1, 2014) (disallowing deductions for personal, living, and family 
expenses). The language in the Treasury Regulations requiring a disease or illness in all cases is 
at odds with the language of the Code, which defines “medical care” using a disjunctive “or” rather 
than a conjunctive “and.” A plain reading of the Code indicates that “amounts paid … for the 
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body,” I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A), should be 
deductible regardless of the presence of disease or illness. Pratt, supra note 155, at 1330. 
158 Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 493 (emphasis added). 
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in conjunction with the woman who was his wife at the time. In addition, the 
procedures were not for the purposes of affecting any structure or function of 
taxpayer’s own body. Rather, they affected the bodies of the gestational carriers, 
who … were not his dependents.159 
Thus, having failed to demonstrate the existence of a medical condition necessitating the expenses 
or that the expenses affected a structure or function of his own body, the courts concluded that the 
taxpayer incurred these procreative expenses for personal reasons.160 
 The Tax Court’s and First Circuit’s analysis affects more than just taxpayers who wish to 
deduct their out-of-pocket expenses for obtaining assistance with procreation using a surrogate. It 
also affects tax treatment every place in the Code that incorporates by reference the definition of 
“medical care” in § 213.161 Thus, for example, it will negatively affect the ability of taxpayers to 
receive tax-free reimbursements of surrogacy-related expenses from employer-provided health 
insurance plans (in the rare case when this coverage is available).162  
  2. Adoption Tax Incentives 
 When a couple secures the assistance of a surrogate to procreate, adoption is often 
necessary to ensure that both members of the couple have a legal relationship with their child. As 
mentioned above, there are two different tax incentives for adoption: (1) the adoption credit and 
(2) the exclusion for employer-provided adoption assistance. These two tax incentives work in 
tandem. For those taxpayers whose employers have created adoption assistance programs (often 
as part of a cafeteria plan of fringe benefits), an exclusion from the taxpayer-employee’s gross 
income is available for the employer’s reimbursement of “qualified adoption expenses” up to a 
specified per-child cap that is adjusted annually for inflation (for 2014, the cap is $13,190).163 For 
those whose employers have not created such a program (or for those who choose not to avail 
themselves of an available program), a nonrefundable credit is available in an amount equal to the 
taxpayer’s “qualified adoption expenses” up to the same per-child cap (again, $13,190 for 2014).164 
Both the exclusion and the credit are phased out at higher income levels.165 The exclusion and the 
credit are coordinated because any amounts reimbursed by an employer under an adoption 
assistance program are ineligible for the credit (i.e., a taxpayer can take either the exclusion or the 
credit with respect to a given expense, but not both).166 
 The exclusion and the credit are also coordinated because they share a common definition 
                                                 
159 Magdalin, 2010-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,150. 
160 Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 493. 
161 Infanti, supra note 145, at 173 n.5. 
162 I.R.C. § 105(b). 
163 Id. § 137; Rev. Rul. 2013-35, § 3.18, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 542. 
164  I.R.C. §§ 23, 26; Rev. Rul. 2013-35, § 3.03, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 539–40. Though 
nonrefundable, the unused portion of the credit is available for carryover to the following five 
taxable years. I.R.C. § 23(c). 
165 I.R.C. §§ 23(b)(2), 137(b)(2). 
166 Id. § 23(d)(1)(D); see Notice 97-9, § III(A), 1997-1 C.B. 365 (“An individual may claim both 
a credit and an exclusion in connection with the adoption of an eligible child. An individual may 
not, however, claim both a credit and an exclusion for the same expense.”). 
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of “qualified adoption expenses.”167  Notably, the definition of “qualified adoption expenses” 
prohibits the exclusion or crediting of expenses related either to (1) “carrying out any surrogate 
parenting arrangement” or (2) “the adoption by an individual of a child who is the child of such 
individual’s spouse.”168  By carving out these expenses, Congress has made the adoption tax 
incentives unavailable to married couples who have formed a family and who wish the law to fully 
recognize that family. These incentives are, as a practical matter, available only when one set of 
individuals procreates and gives their child up for adoption, and another individual or set of 
individuals later adopts that child. As a result, the expenses of adopting a child born through a 
surrogacy arrangement are deductible, if at all, only as medical expenses.169 This ensures the 
complete medicalization of the tax incentives related to procreation. 
 B. THE BODY(IES) FAMILY 
  1. Pre-Windsor 
 In earlier work predating Windsor and the demise of section three of DOMA, I described 
how § 213 creates and corporealizes the so-called traditional family into a “body family.”170 As 
mentioned above, a taxpayer can deduct not only his own expenses for medical care but also those 
of his spouse and dependents.171 In operation, by aggregating the medical expenses of the entire 
family, § 213 treats an illness or disease affecting one member of the body family as if it affected 
the entire family:172  
This corporealisation of the body family is perhaps most easily understood when 
considered from the perspective of the reproductive functions of the body. 
Reproduction is not a solitary function, by which I mean that the taxpayer/husband 
cannot reproduce on his own. Rather, it takes the taxpayer and his wife—each 
contributing genetic material through a sexual union of two bodies—to reproduce 
on their own. In the context of section 213, reproduction can be seen not as a 
function of the individual taxpayer’s body but as a function that can only truly be 
fulfilled by and through the body family, of which the individual taxpayer’s body 
forms no more than a part.173 
In keeping with this view of reproduction as a function of the “traditional” body family (rather 
than of its constituent parts), § 213 goes so far as to “allow[] a deduction for the cost of medical 
treatment of a healthy person in order to mitigate the impact of a disease on the reproductive 
function of a different person’s body so that the two can together—as the body family—fulfill 
                                                 
167 I.R.C. §§ 23(d), 137(d). 
168 Id. § 23(d)(1)(B), (C). 
169 Pratt, supra note 154, at 1159–60. 
170 Infanti, supra note 145, at 166–69. 
171 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
172 Infanti, supra note 145, at 166–67. 
173  Id. at 167 (footnote omitted). Indeed, this is exactly how the IRS appears to have seen 
reproduction in Magdalin. Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491, 493 n.6 (2008), aff’d, 
2010-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,150 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[R]espondent makes the unexplained 
assertion that respondent ‘does not believe that procreation is a covered function of petitioner’s 
male body within the meaning of section 213(d)(1).’ ”).  
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their collective desire to procreate.”174 For instance, a deduction under § 213 is available for the 
expenses incurred when a wife who has no fertility issues herself must undergo in vitro fertilization 
to overcome her husband’s infertility in order to become pregnant.175 With regard to the married 
different-sex couple, then, infertility is a medical problem that affects the entire body family, and 
it is unnecessary to attribute the problem to either of the spouses individually for purposes of § 
213.176  
 Before Windsor, DOMA dismembered nontraditional families for purposes of § 213. Even 
if a same-sex couple were married under state law, their relationship was not recognized for federal 
tax purposes. Accordingly, the availability of a deduction under § 213 for infertility treatments or 
for the cost of a surrogate had to be determined with respect to each spouse individually because 
there was no aggregation of expenses. 177  Thus, before Windsor, § 213 neither created nor 
corporealized nontraditional families into a “body family.” Now that same-sex marriages are 
recognized for federal tax purposes, troubling questions arise regarding whether the “sharp 
distinctions”178 that § 213 formerly drew between married different-sex couples and married same-
sex couples persist. 
  2. Post-Windsor 
   a. Married Different-Sex Couples 
 In Magdalin, the Tax Court left for another day the “lurking questions as to whether (and, 
if so, to what extent) expenditures for IVF procedures and associated costs (e.g., a taxpayer’s legal 
fees and fees paid to, or on behalf of, a surrogate or gestational carrier) would be deductible in the 
presence of an underlying medical condition.” 179  Long before Windsor, commentators made 
convincing arguments that these “lurking questions” should be answered affirmatively for infertile 
married different-sex couples.180 In light of the strength of these arguments as well as the IRS’s 
decision to settle an early surrogacy case in favor of an infertile married different-sex couple out 
of apparent fear of losing,181 married different-sex couples should quite clearly be permitted to 
deduct the costs associated with surrogacy as a medical expense when those costs are incurred to 
overcome fertility problems. After all, married different-sex couples would have no (medical) 
reason to secure the assistance of a surrogate in the absence of fertility problems because they 
                                                 
174 Infanti, supra note 145, at 169. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 173. 
177 Id. (“[I]n the case of non-traditional families, section 213 places questions about the identity of 
the recipient of medical treatments front and centre in any analysis of the deductibility of expenses 
associated with ART. These questions come to the foreground because section 213 generally 
works to dismember non-traditional families. In other words, section 213 refuses to see the non-
traditional family as a unit capable of procreation. Instead of seeing a family, section 213 sees an 
individual who, by himself or herself, is incapable of procreation.” (footnote omitted)). 
178 Id. 
179 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491, 493 (2008), aff’d, 2010-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 50,150 (1st Cir. 2009). 
180 Davis, supra note 152, at 15; Infanti, supra note 145, at 167; Pratt, supra note 155, at 1320–22. 
181 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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could “naturally” procreate (at a significantly lower cost).  
   b. Married Same-Sex Couples Without Fertility Problems  
 If both spouses in a married same-sex couple are fertile, following Magdalin it is equally 
clear that the couple should not be permitted to deduct the costs associated with surrogacy because 
of the absence of both an underlying disease or illness and any treatment being administered to 
one of the same-sex spouses.182 Fertile same-sex couples would therefore receive the same tax 
treatment as married different-sex couples without fertility problems. Despite appearing to be 
similarly situated, however, these same-sex and different-sex couples might actually face quite 
different circumstances that justify treating them differently.  
 Married different-sex couples who have no fertility problems cannot deduct the costs of a 
surrogate to assist with procreation because those medical expenses lack the necessary causal 
relationship with a medical condition. In other words, fertile married different-sex couples have 
no disease or illness that prevents them from procreating naturally. As a result, the only reason to 
secure a surrogate to assist with procreation would be purely personal (and not medical). 
 Even in the absence of fertility problems, married same-sex couples cannot simply 
procreate “naturally.” But the extent to which others must be involved—and which others—
depends on whether we are speaking of a lesbian couple or a gay couple. A fertile lesbian couple 
is in a situation closer to that of a different-sex couple in the sense that involving a surrogate in 
procreation would not be medically indicated but rather a matter of choice. In other words, not 
facing any fertility issues, either of the members of the lesbian couple could become pregnant and 
carry the couple’s child. Thus, fertile different-sex couples and fertile lesbian couples do seem to 
be similarly situated and similar tax treatment (at least vis-à-vis deducting the costs of a surrogate) 
seems justified. 
 For a fertile gay couple, however, how they procreate is not purely a matter of personal 
choice or preference. A gay couple cannot procreate without the aid of a surrogate. Involving a 
surrogate would not be medically indicated—because neither the sperm donor/father nor the 
surrogate would have fertility problems—but it would be a practical necessity. If reproduction is 
truly a function of the body family, why should surrogacy-related costs not be deductible under 
§ 213 when the surrogate is involved to overcome the couple’s inability to have children on their 
own? The primary obstacle to answering this question affirmatively is the heteronormative 
assumption underlying § 213 that medical intervention is “necessary” in the context of procreation 
only when a fertility problem exists.  
 This heteronormative assumption has broader implications that could lead to drawing a 
distinction between two different groups of bodies family. For purposes of § 213, the federal tax 
laws could very well see one group of bodies family—that is, the “traditional” bodies family with 
married different-sex couples at their core—as being naturally capable of procreation and, 
therefore, eligible to claim the tax incentives for procreation in § 213. At the same time, the federal 
tax laws might see another group of bodies family—that is, the “nontraditional” bodies family with 
married same-sex couples at their core—as being inherently incapable of procreation and, 
therefore, excluded from the group eligible to claim the tax incentives for procreation in § 213. 
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This distinction would be in keeping with how § 213 sees reproduction “not as a function of the 
individual taxpayer’s body but as a function that can only truly be fulfilled by and through the 
body family, of which the individual taxpayer’s body forms no more than a part.”183 Although 
drawing such a distinction between traditional and nontraditional families would not change the 
result for fertile gay couples, it might affect the treatment of same-sex couples with fertility 
problems, as discussed below. 
   c. Married Same-Sex Couples With Fertility Problems 
 If a fertile same-sex couple would encounter an insurmountable hurdle in the Magdalin 
case, one might expect an infertile same-sex couple to have a better chance of qualifying for the 
tax incentives for procreation in § 213, just as infertile married different-sex couples do.184 
Because all infertile couples—whether same-sex or different-sex—require medical assistance to 
procreate, one might expect that these similarly situated couples would be treated similarly. But 
the heteronormative assumption underlying § 213 might still prove to be a barrier between same-
sex couples and § 213. As mentioned above, the IRS and/or the courts might very well draw a 
distinction—whether de jure or de facto—between married different-sex couples and married 
same-sex couples because only the former can “naturally” procreate.  
 This view would be consistent with the Tax Court’s opinion in the Magdalin case. To 
demonstrate the necessary causal relationship between the expenses and a medical condition, the 
Tax Court required Magdalin to prove both “(1) ‘that the expenditures were an essential element 
of the treatment’ and (2) ‘that they would not have otherwise been incurred for nonmedical 
reasons.’ ”185  The latter requirement may prove to be particularly troublesome for same-sex 
couples. As discussed above, an infertile gay couple must use a surrogate—and, in a gestational 
surrogacy, an egg donor, too—in order to procreate whether or not the couple is experiencing 
fertility problems. Thus, the involvement of a surrogate is not occasioned by male infertility but 
by the fact that neither spouse is capable of furnishing the necessary egg or womb. 
 The Magdalin court’s focus on whose body actually received the treatment would only 
compound the difficulty of overcoming this requirement. The treatment would not be administered 
to a part of this nontraditional body family (i.e., neither of the same-sex spouses would receive 
treatment); rather, just as in Magdalin, the treatments would be administered to the surrogate and 
egg donor, who are unlikely to be the couple’s dependents for tax purposes.186 Moreover, neither 
the surrogate nor the egg donor would be acting as a substitute for an impaired function or element 
of the infertile spouses’ bodies because the spouses are incapable themselves of supplying an egg 
or a womb even in the absence of fertility issues. This severely undercuts arguments by analogy 
to other areas (e.g., kidney donation) where expenses of third parties have qualified for 
deduction—analogies that are heavily relied upon to qualify the surrogacy expenses of infertile 
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married different-sex couples for deduction.187  
 Infertile lesbian couples would have a better argument for deducting many of the expenses 
associated with use of a surrogate; however, there would still be a question regarding whether the 
cost of obtaining sperm would be deductible. Like the infertile gay couple, an infertile lesbian 
couple must obtain sperm to procreate regardless of whether or not the couple is experiencing 
fertility problems.188  
 Potentially thornier issues arise if only one of the spouses in a same-sex couple is infertile 
and the other is fertile. Because these nontraditional bodies family cannot “naturally” procreate, 
the aggregation of functions and expenses that occurs in the context of the “traditional” body 
family might not occur with fertile/infertile same-sex couples. Because procreation, even though 
a function of the same-sex spouse’s individual bodies, is not a function of their body family, it 
would not be surprising if each spouse’s body were considered separately for purposes of § 213 
because they each have the same reproductive capability. In other words, so long as one same-sex 
spouse’s reproductive system is functioning, why would the body family not avail itself of that 
system to procreate, just as we assume that different-sex couples will procreate naturally if their 
reproductive systems are working properly? If adopted, this approach would create a sharp divide 
between married same-sex and married different-sex couples. On the one hand, the federal tax 
laws would pay no attention to whether a husband were infertile so long as his wife were unable 
to carry a child because this would impair the reproductive function of the body family. On the 
other hand, which spouse procreates—and why—might be of much greater import when § 213 is 
applied to married same-sex couples. The couple’s (personal and/or tax-motivated) choice not to 
have the fertile spouse procreate might significantly undercut (if not wholly eliminate) any 
arguments in favor of deductibility because these same-sex couple would, in essence, be treated 
the same as the single taxpayer in Magdalin. 
 C. THE MORE THINGS CHANGE… 
 When the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the Secretary of the Treasury promised that 
the ruling would provide same-sex couples with “ ‘certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing 
guidance.’ ”189 As the discussion above amply demonstrates, “certainty” is not an adjective that 
applies to the tax treatment of expenses incurred by married same-sex couples—and, particularly, 
married gay couples—procreating with the aid of a surrogate. It appears that sharp distinctions 
may continue to be made under § 213 between traditional and nontraditional families even after 
the Windsor decision. With regard to fertile couples, § 213 may treat similarly couples who are 
not similarly situated (particularly as we compare married different-sex and married gay couples). 
With regard to infertile couples, § 213 may treat married different-sex couples more leniently than 
married same-sex couples.  The medical expense deduction should be available to married 
different-sex couples so long as the wife is unable to carry a child, regardless of whether the 
husband is experiencing any fertility issues. In contrast, even were one or both same-sex spouses 
experiencing fertility problems, the medicalization of procreation in § 213 might very well erect 
an insuperable barrier to accessing this tax incentive because the couple cannot “naturally” 
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procreate. In other words, with regard to infertile couples, § 213, as currently construed, is quite 
likely to treat similarly situated couples dissimilarly. 
 These distinctions—both extant and inchoate—are inconsistent with the tenor of the 
Windsor decision and its progeny as well as the spirit of Revenue Ruling 2013-17. The Windsor 
Court placed great emphasis on removing the stigma and disadvantages that DOMA imposed on 
married same-sex couples (as compared to married different-sex couples).190 In its opinion, the 
Court spoke of the “equal dignity” of same-sex couples and how DOMA restricted same-sex 
couples’ “freedom and choice.”191 The IRS seems to have done its best in Revenue Ruling 2013-
17 to carry this rhetoric of equality and dignity into the application of the federal tax laws.192 
Expanding the focus beyond the same-sex couple, Windsor and its progeny also considered the 
effect of same-sex marriage bans on the children of same-sex couples and on same-sex couples’ 
ability to form a family—in some cases specifically addressing the situation of couples with as yet 
unborn children. As explored at length above, the growing number of decisions striking down state 
same-sex marriage bans have all considered the importance of relationship recognition to the 
children (current, expected, or contemplated) of same-sex couples, rejected heteronormative 
arguments that procreation and child rearing can and should take place only in the context of 
different-sex couples, and affirmatively validated same-sex couples as appropriate and acceptable 
parents.193  
 The rhetoric of Windsor and its progeny as well as of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 starkly 
contrast with a legal landscape that, if unabetted, will very likely result in the denial of access to § 
213 for married same-sex couples. As Katherine Pratt explained before Windsor: 
Denying a medical expense deduction for fertility treatment costs increases the 
after-tax cost for the treatment, which increases the cost barrier to ART access and 
indirectly restricts use of ARTs. In the Magdalin case, the taxpayer assumed that 
loss of the tax deduction is the legal equivalent of a prohibition on access to 
ARTs.194 
Thus, far from validating same-sex couples as persons and as parents, the current construction of 
§ 213 would have the effect of creating a financial disincentive for same-sex couples to 
procreate—and for gay couples, who cannot procreate without the assistance of a surrogate, § 213 
might erect an insuperable financial barrier to procreation. And the distinction that § 213 may 
continue to draw between married same-sex and married different-sex couples will not be erased 
when the last of the state-level same-sex marriage bans falls. Put differently, the distinction 
between traditional and nontraditional families is not a function of the incorporation of state-level 
discrimination into the federal tax laws but a function of the heteronormative assumption 
underpinning § 213 that the only couples who can or should procreate are those capable of doing 
so “naturally”—and these couples only need (medical) assistance with procreation if they have 
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fertility issues.195 The contrast in treatment is made even starker by the fact that the courts have 
resoundingly rejected heteronormative arguments that procreation should take place only within 
different-sex couples—arguments that differ little in substance from the heteronormative 
assumptions underpinning § 213 regarding the context in which procreation does (should?) occur. 
In short, rather than having the effect of reducing the heteronormativity of § 213, the Windsor 
decision, its progeny, and Revenue Ruling 2013-17 all appear to have had the perverse effect of 
exacerbating and accentuating the heteronormativity of that Code provision as it applies to 
surrogacy-related expenses. 
V. RENEWING THE CHALLENGE TO § 213 
 The taxpayer in Magdalin, who represented himself, argued that “denying him a medical 
expense deduction for fertility treatment costs violated his right to reproductive autonomy and his 
right to be free from sex discrimination because, in his view, loss of the deduction would deny 
men access to ARTs.”196 The Tax Court summarily dismissed the taxpayer’s argument (and the 
First Circuit never even addressed it), stating: 
Although petitioner at times attempts to frame the deductibility of the relevant 
expenses as an issue of constitutional dimensions, under the facts and 
circumstances of his case, it does not rise to that level. Petitioner’s gender, marital 
status, and sexual orientation do not bear on whether he can deduct the expenses at 
issue.197 
Taking this constitutional challenge more seriously, Katherine Pratt examined the operation of § 
213, as interpreted by the Tax Court in Magdalin, and found the provision immune from attack 
because the statute is facially neutral, does not bar access to assisted reproductive technology, and 
draws distinctions that were not borne of animus toward lesbians and gay men.198  
 Both the Tax Court’s and Pratt’s evaluation of Magdalin’s constitutional challenge to the 
application of § 213 to his surrogacy-related expenses predated the Windsor decision. Windsor and 
its progeny appear to have changed this legal landscape significantly enough that the door to 
constitutional scrutiny may now be open. As discussed above, the federal court decisions following 
Windsor have all resoundingly rejected heteronormative justifications regarding procreation and 
child rearing as legitimate grounds for discriminating against same-sex couples. Though 
unarticulated, these same justifications lurk below the surface of § 213 as taken-for-granted 
assumptions that have informed the application of that provision by the IRS and the courts. Making 
the case against the current construction of § 213 even stronger, a growing chorus of federal 
courts—at both the trial and appellate levels—have been finding that sexual-orientation-based 
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classifications should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, which makes those classification far 
more vulnerable to constitutional challenge.199 
 Interestingly, the ostensible neutrality of § 213 made it more difficult to challenge. On its 
face, the statute draws no distinction based on sexual orientation (or gender), as it defines “medical 
care” in a neutral fashion. The only distinction that § 213 explicitly draws is between those who 
are married (and who are treated as part of a larger body family whose illnesses, medical issues, 
and medical expenses can be aggregated) and those who are unmarried (and who are treated as 
individuals who are generally unable to aggregate their medical expenses with those of other 
taxpayers).200 But that neutrality existed only on the surface of the statute and greatly benefited 
from DOMA’s masking effect. 201  By treating all same-sex couples as unmarried, DOMA 
permitted § 213 to draw a sharp distinction between traditional and nontraditional families—and, 
more particularly, between married different-sex and married same-sex couples—without actually 
appearing to do so.202  
 But now that Windsor has struck down section three of DOMA, the discriminatory 
application of § 213 should be transparent and visible rather than hidden and masked. Instead of 
just drawing a sharp distinction between married and unmarried taxpayers, the current construction 
of § 213 threatens to draw a sharp distinction between married same-sex and married different-sex 
couples—based on outdated assumptions regarding who does (and ought to) procreate that the 
courts have repeatedly rejected. Section 213 will likely validate and provide monetary support for 
married different-sex couples who wish to procreate when they have tried and failed to do so on 
their own—including support for obtaining the assistance of a surrogate. At the same time, 
however, § 213 will likely deny the same level of validation and support to same-sex couples—
and, when it comes to surrogacy, seems to especially stigmatize, deter, and perhaps completely 
impede procreation by gay couples. Because § 213 now aggregates the expenses of all married 
couples, whether same-sex or different-sex, this distinction is no longer based on marital status (as 
recognized by the federal government) but turns directly on the sexual orientation of the married 
couple attempting to procreate.203 
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 The cover that one unconstitutional statute provided to another arguably unconstitutional  
statute has now been removed. The time is ripe to strip away more of the remaining discrimination 
in § 213 (though perhaps not all of it quite yet).204 This task could be accomplished in a quite 
modest fashion, by simply applying the well-accepted canon of statutory construction that “ ‘where 
a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional 
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the 
latter.’ ”205 To avoid constitutional questions and with a nod to the changed legal landscape, the 
IRS or the courts could choose to interpret the definition of “medical care” in § 213 more broadly 
than they have done in the past when considering the propriety of deducting procreation-related 
expenses—just as they chose to strike down section three of DOMA and to implement that decision 
in as sweeping a fashion as possible.206 Rather than having the deductibility of medical expenses 
for procreation turn on the existence of a diagnosis of infertility, the IRS or the courts could simply 
acknowledge that reproduction is a function of all human bodies—and not just a function of the 
body family.207  By acknowledging that reproduction is a function of each individual’s body, the 
IRS or the courts could then acknowledge that the medical steps taken by same-sex couples to 
procreate—including obtaining the assistance of a surrogate—are “for the purpose of affecting” 
this “function” of the human body by allowing those who are otherwise incapable of procreating 
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without assistance to do so.208 In fact, such an interpretation would be entirely consistent with the 
IRS’s reliance upon this very same canon of construction in Revenue Ruling 2013-17, where the 
it interpreted the gendered terms “husband” and “wife” in a gender-neutral fashion in order to 
avoid raising constitutional questions.209 Such an interpretation would also be in keeping with the 
promise of the Windsor decision and its progeny, which have focused strongly on the impact of 
discrimination on the procreative and child-rearing capabilities of same-sex couples. 
* * * * 
 Following Windsor, many seem to think that the battle for “marriage equality” at the federal 
level is essentially over. After all, the new battlefront seems to be at the state level where LGBT 
rights organizations are vigorously fighting the remaining state same-sex marriage bans. This sense 
that the federal tax laws now treat same-sex couples the same as they treat different-sex couples is 
only compounded by the IRS’s outwardly generous approach in applying the Windsor decision to 
the federal tax laws. But we should not be lulled into thinking that there are no remaining vestiges 
of sexual-orientation-based discrimination left in the federal tax laws post-Windsor. DOMA may 
have been the most obviously heteronormative aspect of the federal tax laws, but it was by no 
means the only way in which heteronormativity has crept into the Code. In this essay, I have 
continued my work exploring the gap between the promise of Windsor and the reality faced by 
same-sex couples as they navigate a tax system that was crafted over decades when discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation was not only legal but also so normal and natural that it became 
part of the unnoticed background of our existence. It will take time to uncover all of the ways in 
which heteronormativity persists in the federal tax laws post-Windsor and to suggest means of 
redressing this continued sexual-orientation-based discrimination. This symposium on 
“Compensated Surrogacy After Windsor” has provided a nice opportunity to highlight an 
important way in which the federal tax laws continue to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation and to suggest a means of redressing that discrimination. 
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